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The aim of this thesis is to call attention to some of the shortcomings of a cognitivist 
theory’s incorporation of feeling into a philosophy of emotion. There has been a tendency within 
the cognitivist theories to assume as irreducible the intentional structures through which these 
theories operate. A consequence of this tendency often sees feelings compartmentalized through 
internal and external distinctions, such as bodily feelings and world-directed feelings. What 
appears to be ignored is the notion that prior to all emotional experience we have already found 
ourselves belonging to a world, and attempts at a phenomenological understanding of a category 
of feeling as a pre-intentional background sense of belonging to a world prior to experience 
become obscured or dismissed. I argue for developing a phenomenological approach in 



















A traditional understanding of a cognitivist theory of emotion suggests that emotions are 
reducible to cognitive states, such as judgments. In this context, emotions have evaluative and 
intentional content. There has been a tendency within the cognitivist theories of emotion to 
assume as irreducible the intentional structures through which these theories operate. A 
consequence of this tendency often sees feeling as a residual component of the intentional 
structures of emotional experience and compartmentalized through internal and external 
distinctions, such as bodily feelings and world-directed feelings. The aim of this thesis is to call 
attention to some of the shortcomings of a cognitivist theory’s incorporation of feeling into a 
philosophy of emotion. I focus specifically on one category of feeling, a background sense of 
belonging to a world. What often appears to be ignored is the notion that prior to all emotional 
experience we have already found ourselves belonging to a world, and attempts at a 
phenomenological understanding of feeling as a pre-intentional background sense of belonging 
to a world prior to an emotional experience become obscured or dismissed.  
The cognitivist accounts I present in this thesis proffer two contrasting views of how to 
incorporate feeling into emotional experience. On one hand, emotions are judgments that take 
objects through intentional states while, on the other hand, emotions contain feelings that appear 
to be the most intimate part of our emotions and permeate all of emotional experience. A 
problem arises regarding how emotions can be cognitive states while at the same time 
recognizing feeling as a central component. In this case, the underlying concern of each 
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cognitivist view I present here regards how to unite the cognitive component with the feeling 
component of emotional experience.  
In each cognitivist theory’s attempt to accommodate feeling into the intentionality of 
emotion, I show how a bifurcated view of emotions through cognitive and affective components 
obscures a phenomenological perspective that demonstrates feeling as permeable throughout the 
intentional structures of emotion. I argue that each cognitivist view fails respectively to 
recognize a category of feeling that lies as a pre-intentional background sense of belonging to a 
world and is responsible for shaping and motivating much of the content of our emotional 
experience. I conclude by arguing for a phenomenological approach in illuminating the 
background structure of emotion, and I propose “existential feelings” as a basis from which to 
examine further this neglected category of feeling. 
 In the first section I introduce Robert C. Solomon’s theory that emotions constitute a 
framework of evaluative judgments that structure our way of experiencing the world in 
significant and meaningful ways. At the heart of Solomon’s philosophy lies what he calls 
“rational romanticism,” the idea that emotions are far more sophisticated than being simply about 
feelings. For Solomon an emotion is not a feeling in response to a situation but rather an 
interpretation, an evaluative judgment. At times we may not even be consciously aware that a 
judgment has been made. As emotions consist only of evaluative judgments, feelings are reduced 
to the inconsequential role of being a product of physiological responses to these evaluative 
judgments, such as the release of adrenaline. Thus Solomon forces a division between emotions 
and feelings by limiting the affective component of emotion to bodily feelings. It is evaluative 
judgments and how they constitute the ways we experience our world that embodies the 
“passion” we typically associate with our emotions. These evaluative judgments are always 
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about something, meaning emotions always take objects through intentional states. However, the 
way emotions hold objects within evaluative judgments is open to a degree of reflection in that 
one may accept or dismiss a judgment once it becomes consciously discernable. By the fact these 
judgments are susceptible to a degree of reflection there is an acquiescence of responsibility for 
our emotions. I argue, first, that if emotions as evaluative judgments contain within them the sole 
source of meaning and significance of our experienced world, then by limiting feelings to bodily 
feelings it seems Solomon is to unable account for the background context out of which these 
emotions arise. The world that is the background to all our emotional experiences becomes taken 
for granted. Second, I argue that it remains unclear whether or not I can be responsible for this 
background world as an object of emotion. 
 The first section sees the role of feeling in Solomon’s theory limited to bodily feelings. 
The second section concerns Peter Goldie’s accommodation of feelings by providing for an 
externally-directed component of feeling alongside bodily feelings in what Goldie calls “feeling 
towards.” Goldie states that much of philosophy is guilty of over-intellectualizing emotions in 
such a way that much of the focus targets the intentionality of emotional experience while the 
feeling component remains neglected. Emotions involve not only the taking of objects through 
intentional states, but also the perception of objects simultaneously motivates an externally-
directed feeling towards these objects in a way that captures both the intentional and affective 
components of emotional experience. Bodily feelings participate in this experience by 
“borrowing” from the emotion’s world-directed intentionality in a way that makes bodily 
feelings and feelings towards inextricably intertwined in emotional experience. First, I argue that 
if both bodily feelings and feeling towards participate in an emotional experience, there remains 
an experiential ambiguity as to what distinguishes these two components of feelings during an 
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emotional experience. What is needed is a phenomenology of feeling that makes no use of 
internal and external distinctions of feeling. Second, it remains unclear what motivates a feeling 
towards without reference to a background structure. Like Solomon, Goldie’s theory appears to 
take for granted the world that is the background to all our emotional experiences. 
The first two sections introduce two cognitivist views that attempt to accommodate the 
role of feelings within their intentional structures. I argue that each view fails respectively to 
recognize a category of feeling that lies as a pre-intentional background sense of belonging and 
relating to a world. In the third section I begin arguing for a phenomenological approach in 
illuminating the background structure of emotion. Perceptual and cognitive theories of emotion 
fair well in explicating the processes through which evaluative judgments manifest as emotions. 
But the process through which emotions take objects through intentional states is already 
presupposing a sense of what it means for an object to “be” in a world. I use Edmund Husserl’s 
criticism of scientific methodology to identify the perspective through which many cognitive 
theories formulate an understanding of the world through propositional attitudes. I argue that the 
world that is the background to our emotional experiences cannot be an object articulated 
through intentional states, and a background feeling of belonging to a world shapes the possible 
ways through which objects become experienced through our emotions. 
The fourth section focuses on Matthew Ratcliffe’s theory of “existential feelings” to 
illuminate further what shapes and motivates a background structure within the context of a 
world. The “world” in this context is a modal space of possibilities that Ratcliffe calls our “sense 
of reality.” Possibilities in the world not only appear to us as potentialities but also in ways that 
are enticing and personal. Existential feelings operate as this pre-intentional background sense of 
belonging to a world that shapes the possible ways objects may appear to us in personal and 
5 
 
meaningful ways. I provide four examples of existential feelings. In the first two I compare and 
contrast existential feelings of hope and hopelessness. Existential feelings in both examples 
demonstrate a background feeling that permeates all thought and activity and contributes to a 
sense of relatedness with the world. For the most part, existential feelings operate indiscernibly 
as a backdrop to our everyday lives. In the last two examples I use alterations in everyday 
activities and perturbations of reality through mental illness to provide examples of how 
existential feelings may be forced to the foreground of experience. I conclude by returning to 
Solomon and Goldie to highlight some of the challenges faced by a cognitivist view of emotions 






















Chapter I: Solomon, Feeling, and Evaluative Judgments 
 
Regarding the relationship between affectivity and cognition, much of the philosophical 
and interdisciplinary discussion calls attention to recent developments within the perceptual and 
cognitive theories of emotion. One such perception-based theory, Stephanie D. Preston and Frans 
B. M. de Waal’s Perception-Action Model (PAM), focuses on a stringently mechanistic and 
evolutionary account of this relationship. In empathy, for example, the perception of another’s 
affective state generates a process of automatic responses within the prefrontal cortex that then 
primes the corresponding subclass of perception-act mechanisms to create a representation of the 
other’s affective state in the observer.1  
However, in a cognitive theory of emotion, this relationship often develops a hybrid of 
perceptual and cognitive elements through intentional states. Intentionality in this context refers 
to the idea that all emotions are about something, and that which the emotion is about is called 
the emotion’s object. To say emotions are intentional is to say emotions establish connections 
between us and the objects that come to make up our world. In The Passions: Emotions and the 
Meaning of Life, Robert C. Solomon states that the connections that emotions establish constitute 
a framework of evaluative judgments through which the world is experienced. Emotions are not 
judgments about preconceived objects but rather these judgments are what shape our experience 
of objects. For example, one does not first encounter a snake and then determines it to be 
frightening; rather, it is an evaluative judgment that structures the experience to make the object 
                                                          
1. Preston and de Waal, “Empathy,” 4. 
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what it is: a frightening snake. As emotions consist only of these evaluative judgments, the role 
of affectivity is reduced to a residual product of physiological processes within the body. The 
apparent intensity of an emotion’s “feeling” represents only the personal significance of a 
judgment and constitutes nothing of an emotion’s true “essence.”2, 3 
Solomon’s and de Waal’s theories help further our understanding of the basic structures 
of affectivity and cognition, particularly in the fields of cognitive neuroscience and 
psychopathology. However, their application is not without controversy. From certain 
philosophical perspectives we find in the relevant research a near ubiquitous tendency to assume 
as irreducible the intentional structures through which these theories operate, and attempts at a 
phenomenological understanding of feeling as deeply-rooted or permeable throughout an 
underlying experiential structure become obscured or dismissed. The extent to which these 
accounts tend to assume or dismiss this phenomenological perspective seems at odds with the 
intuitive conviction that feelings constitute an integral and inextricable connection with the 
processes that provide individual meaning and a foundation upon which to experience a personal 
world. The preliminary analysis begins with Solomon’s cognitive theory to explicate this 
tendency.  
The intuitive conviction that feeling plays an integral role in the shaping of personal 
experience, however, is not entirely lost on Solomon. Emotional experiences are often associated 
with certain sensations of feelings. One may feel irritable, tense, or flush when one experiences 
anger, for example. Although such sensations may accompany the experience of anger, it does 
not follow that these associated sensations of feeling are what constitutes the emotion. An 
emotion is never simply a feeling. Feelings, Solomon states, “are typically if not always 
                                                          
2. Solomon, The Passions, 97. 
3. Ibid., 129. 
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associated with our emotions,” but feelings are only physiologically linked with emotional 
experience through bodily feelings.
4
 Emotions are always about something, and for this reason 
emotions always take objects through intentional states.  
Fear in the following example may be a particularly visceral emotion for anyone 
experiencing severe turbulence onboard an aircraft in flight. In this example the emotion of fear 
appears to manifest itself in the belief that my life is in imminent danger. How would Solomon 
decipher this experience? While it is tempting to say this emotion is about a concern regarding 
the structural integrity of the aircraft during a turbulent event, such danger is seldom the case as 
most aircraft are designed to withstand incredible forces. The emotion is about my belief that my 
life is in danger. The object of this emotion—the aircraft as a fearful object posing a threat to my 
safety—represents something subjectively distinct from the emotion’s cause—a turbulent 
atmospheric event. Turbulence may be the cause that aroused a sensual awareness to my present 
situation, but nothing about the outside atmospheric conditions or the aircraft’s structural 
integrity is represented in the belief that constitutes my immediate emotion of fear. Once the 
plane lands safely or I come to understand that nothing is to be feared since these occurrences are 
common and perfectly safe, the belief that my life is in danger is no longer tenable, and the 
emotion is necessarily terminated. For this reason Solomon would say my emotion is a belief-
judgment, and the object of my belief-judgment is not to be equated with the cause of my belief-
judgment. As for the associated feelings of fear, they are the physiological processes resulting 
subsequently from this judgment, such as an increased heart rate or the release of adrenaline.  
In the example above, the emotion did not constitute a sensation of feelings in response to 
an experienced discomfort. Instead, the emotion constituted a rational evaluation of my situation 
as dangerous from which a bodily feeling of fear followed. Feeling, Solomon states, provides 
                                                          
4. Solomon, The Passions, 111. 
9 
 
little relevance in any such discernment. This is because feelings as physiological responses 
contain no means of intentional or self-conscious assessment; feelings are neither rational nor 
deliberative. The bodily chemistry and the sensations caused by that chemistry themselves have 
nothing to do with emotions.
5
 Feelings do not have directions that identify what the emotion is 
about. Emotions are always about something, so to say that “I am fearful” would be an 
incomplete expression in that it fails to identify what the emotion is about.
6
 The experience of 
anger, for example, may cause a rise in blood pressure, but someone experiencing high blood 
pressure does not require one to be angry. Furthermore, one may be angry without experiencing 
anything in particular.
7
 If emotions are to contain the meaning and value we typically associate 
with emotional experience, then we must reject feeling as playing an essential role in emotions. 
This allows Solomon to conclude that emotions as evaluative judgments, not feelings, provide 
the meaningful context through which we find ourselves belonging to a unique and personal 
world.  
Solomon’s theory provides a reasoned response to the antiquated understanding of 
emotions as identified with bodily sensations, such as observed in Descartes’s account of 
emotions as the movement of the “animal spirits” in the soul.8 Understanding what motivates 
these animal spirits to act upon our cognitive faculties poses a serious challenge to any theory 
that forces a division of body and mind. Solomon’s theory is not a harmonious balance of 
cognitive and affective faculties but a theory that finds these two faculties synonymous. 
“Reason,” Solomon states, “is nothing other than perspicacious passion.”9 Emotions reduced to 
                                                          
5. Solomon, The Passions, 95. 
6. Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” 21-22. 
7. Solomon, “The Logic of Emotion,” 44. 
8. Descartes, “Passions of the Soul,” 330-334. 




their pathological and somatic components provide no means of cognitive discernment in a 
meaningful and value-laden context. For Solomon, this purely empirical perspective observes the 
world in a state of matter-of-fact impartiality and proffers no decisive role in motivating a 
context of personal significance. We do not experience the world as this “lifeless complex of 
facts.”10 Emotions are not concerned with the world but with my world. A scientific and 
objective world is incapable of providing the meaningful content of our personal lives. Instead, it 
is through our emotions that the world is experienced as a subjective and personal world. 
Emotions constitute the sole source of meaning and value each of us experience subjectively, and 
by understanding emotions to be evaluative judgments, this subjective world becomes my 
personal world. 
Solomon’s point here is to introduce the conception that our world is not experienced 
through the perspective of an objective, scientific “reality.” Emotions are subjective, and their 
objects are not about “facts” from a scientific and impersonal comportment of the world. 
Emotions are about our world. The impersonal rationalization of our world through an objective 
and scientific perspective, the “myth of the passions” as Solomon describes it, has instilled in us 
the resilient belief that emotion and reason represent two categorically distinct capacities of the 
mind; emotions are the capricious, distorting, and subservient counterpart to the faculty of 
reason. The subjectivity of emotional experience, rather than applying standards of interpretation 
and evaluation to pre-given objects, supplies these standards through a framework within which 
these objects are experienced as our personal reality.
11
 Every emotion is a unique way of seeing 
the world. Emotions are not simply judgments about objects in the world but rather “an active 
                                                          
10. Solomon, The Passions, 19. 
11. Ibid., 135. 
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way of structuring our experience, a way of experiencing something.”12 It is through a system of 
judgments that emotions frame the experience of our world in a subjective way. The way the 
world is structured for us through our emotions establishes the framework of values that gives 
our experience of objects meaning and significance. In the aircraft example, the judgment that 
maintains an aircraft as an object of fear is tenable only within the confines of subjective 
experience. The point is not to give primacy to either perspective but to demonstrate how 
emotions as evaluative judgments establish the cognitive framework through which the objective 
world becomes experienced subjectively. This hypothesis requires Solomon to formulate this 
conception through a “two-world” distinction: an objective reality and our subjective 
“surreality.”13 
All objects of emotions are in our surreality. This is not to say emotions are simply 
“mental states” that remain inside our minds. Emotions are always about something, and for this 
reason the logical nature of Solomon’s cognitive framework makes an emotion a “structure 
linking ourselves and the objects of our world which provides the structures of our world.”14 
However, using the aircraft example, we may see the object of an emotion suggests two separate 
perspectives of the same object through Solomon’s two-world distinction. I may believe the 
object of my emotion immediately concerns a physical object, and the emotion arises as an 
appropriate response to this physical object in a situational context. But upon closer inspection 
we see this may not be the case as the aircraft as a physical object proffers nothing fearful in this 
regard. Instead, the emotion shapes the experience to become an object experienced as dangerous 
through my surreality. While these two perspectives may refer to the same object, an aircraft in a 
turbulent event, one represents the cause of the emotion while the other represents the object of 
                                                          
12. Solomon, “Nothing to be Proud,” 31. 
13. Solomon, The Passions, 115. 
14. Ibid., 119. 
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the emotion. The cause of the emotion is always an actual event, like a turbulent atmosphere, and 
is an objective part of reality. The object of the emotion, the aircraft as a fearful object, is always 
intentional and experienced subjectively as part of my surreality. Furthermore, by demonstrating 
how an emotion of fear is terminated with the aircraft’s safe landing or the understanding that 
turbulence poses no danger, Solomon’s two-world distinction is reinforced, for an objective 
account of this scenario is not susceptible to this sort of deliberation. The difference between 
reality and surreality is the difference between objective and subjective. One is not superimposed 
upon another; rather, one is the cognitive framework through which the other is experienced. 
Recognition of Solomon’s two-world distinction accommodates subjectivity within his 
theory of emotion by uncoupling emotions from their physiological ties. He says emotions are 
not these “blind or irrational forces that victimize us.”15 Objects in reality are not pre-given with 
meaningful significance. Upon the sensation of turbulence, the experience of fear was not my 
response to this event but my interpretation of this event. The difference may appear subtle, but 
if nothing lies pre-given in an objective reality discernable within a subjective context, it follows 
that an emotion is not a physiological response but an evaluative judgment of my situation. I may 
not be consciously aware of this judgment in its immediate formulation, yet this judgment is 
necessarily my own. I may accept, alter, or dismiss this judgment once the emotion becomes 
consciously discernable. My fellow passengers may assure me my life is in no immediate danger, 
and the emotion is dismissed. In this case, emotions not only involve personal evaluations of my 
situation, but by the fact that these evaluations are susceptible to a degree of reflection or 
intervention, there is an acquiescence of personal responsibility for my emotions. Furthermore, if 
the emotion were a physiological response embodied in the sensation of fear, then how could we 
account for the variety of individual reactions upon encountering a turbulent event? Perhaps 
                                                          
15. Solomon, The Passions, 15. 
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some find the experience exciting, others appear oblivious. A physiologically-based theory 
proffers no substantive explanation for this discrepancy.  
To what degree may I be responsible for an emotional judgment? Solomon states we may 
mistakenly identify emotion with the involuntary onset of feeling. I may feel strong bodily 
sensations upon encountering a turbulent event, bringing about an awareness and vigilance of my 
current circumstances. Nevertheless, I fail to recognize a judgment has already been made. 
Solomon states that not all emotions are explicit. We make thousands of these judgments each 
day. This acquiescence of responsibility, instead, lies in Solomon’s claim that all emotions can 
become reflective.
16
 If emotions were not capable of some degree of personal intervention, then 
how emotions contribute to a collective framework constitutive of my personal world would 
appear rather arbitrary and blind to our personal interests and purposes, and this would be 
counter to his position that emotions “structure the world to our purposes.”17 However, it remains 
unclear whether or not every emotion is open to the same level of rational reflection and 
intervention. The aircraft example provided a clear example of an emotion susceptible to rational 
intervention and therefore an emotion for which I was personally responsible. But emotions like 
these are specific occurrences. Solomon says the self is at the heart of every emotion, but in 
every judgment I have already found myself with a sense of belonging to a world in which 
something like fear is already a possibility. Emotions develop within a context of significance 
because I have already deemed certain things to be significant and meaningful. While the 
emotion of fear may be a specific occurrence that is personally meaningful, it is within a 
background context of already being in and belonging to a world where such possibilities exist 
and out of which such occurrences find a source of meaningfulness. 
                                                          
16. Solomon, The Passions, 131. 
17. Ibid., xvii. 
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The onus of Solomon’s theory rests upon his capacity to maintain that emotions as a 
collective framework of evaluative judgments within our surreality provide the sole source of 
meaning and significance of our experienced world. A scientific and empirical world reveals 
nothing of objects in a personal and practical context. In doing away with feeling, we face a 
question regarding how evaluative judgments arise within a context of meaning and value out of 
an objective world bereft of such meaning. For Solomon, this context lies exclusively within our 
surreality’s collective framework of evaluative judgments. I may assume a degree of 
responsibility for the ways in which evaluative judgments develop their objects within my 
surreality, but it remains unclear whether or not I may assume any degree of responsibility for 
the background context that is already inhabited when a judgment is made. I have already found 
myself inhabiting a world when an emotion is made. Thus it remains unclear because the world 
does not appear to be an object for which I may assume responsibility. Perhaps by tracing back 
to prior experiences interpreted as valuable and significant? For if the experience of an object is 
to be encountered as significant, this must only point to something already deemed significant.  
A distinction between “emotion” and “mood” may proffer this missing foundation, for if 
emotions represent specific occurrences of meaning, it may be the case that moods incorporate 
this background world out of which emotions occur. Yet Solomon’s definition of mood renders 
us no closer to an explanation: “Moods are generalized emotions: An emotion focuses its 
attention on more-or-less particular objects and situations, whereas a mood enlarges its grasp to 
attend to the world as a whole…”18 For Solomon the difference between an emotion and a mood 
is what they are about. Emotions are about specific occurrences while moods take the world as 
their object. For Solomon, moods are nothing more than generalized emotions. This simply 
restates the same explanation in broader terms; this does not solve the problem. If moods are 
                                                          
18. Solomon, The Passions, 71. 
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about the world, then what accounts for the phenomenal and value-laden context out of which 
moods arise? The pre-given world is already inhabited prior to emotional experience. The pre-
given world in this sense does not seem to be an object towards which I can assume 
responsibility, nor does it seem possible to assume responsibility for a background sense of 
belonging to a world that is an ever-present context out of which judgments are made. A sense of 
belonging to a world is already assumed when an evaluative judgment is made and pointing to 
larger and larger generalized objects of emotions would not accommodate this feeling. As it 
seems to me, the theory breaks down in ad infinitum justification. 
I believe the resulting ambiguity poses an insurmountable challenge to Solomon’s two-
world distinction. In doing away with feeling, it does not appear that positing a two-world 
distinction is able to explicate how evaluative judgments arise within a context of meaning 
without accounting for a background sense of belonging to a world that we already inhabit when 
a judgment is made. What Solomon means by “feelings” are limited to physiological responses 
to evaluative judgments, and we have demonstrated that without an object, these types of bodily 
feelings do little in telling us what emotions are about. This is why feeling plays an insignificant 
role in Solomon’s theory. But at every moment we are beings that find ourselves already 
belonging to a world, a background feeling presupposed by the intelligibility of propositional 
subject-object relationships. If within the world a specific object is to be encountered as 
something to be feared, it is because a background feeling of belonging to a world allows us to 
relate to objects in a way that is fearful. It appears Solomon’s theory accommodates specific 
occurrences of emotion, but without incorporating feeling it remains unclear how a framework of 
evaluative judgments can accommodate the background context of the pre-given world out of 
which they arise. Using Solomon’s interpretation of mood as taking the world as a generalized 
16 
 
object to account for the background feeling in which we find ourselves belonging to a world is a 
conclusion simply too great with the premises he provides. 
In the subsequent section I continue the task of introducing the need for a 
phenomenological analysis of feeling as deeply-rooted and permeable throughout an underlying 
experiential structure. Some parts of emotional experience involve feelings that are feelings of 
the body while other parts involve feelings that are not, and there is a need to distinguish 
between these two types of feeling in Solomon’s theory: feelings of the body and feelings 
directed toward the world. Presently, what is needed is a theory of emotion that incorporates 
these two types of feeling within emotional experience. One view that maintains the conviction 
that these two types of feeling constitute an integral and inextricable connection with what 
emotion reveals about our world is held by Peter Goldie. Solomon’s and Goldie’s theories are 
similar in that both maintain emotions are intentional states, with the addition that Goldie finds 
that feelings also participate in the intentionality of emotion. The primary difference lies in the 
role Goldie provides feelings in emotional experience and his attempt to distinguish between 
bodily feelings and what he calls “feeling towards,” which are feelings directed towards objects 















Chapter II: Goldie, Bodily Feelings, and Feeling Towards 
 
The preceding section challenged Solomon’s theory that feelings are both limited to a 
physiological role within the body and play an inconsequential role in emotions. A bodily feeling 
alone cannot tell us what an emotion is about; thus, the true essence of an emotion lies in the 
evaluative judgment. Solomon’s theory implicitly recognized that when an evaluative judgment 
is made we already find ourselves with a background feeling of belonging to a world that lies 
pre-given before such judgments are possible. However, what Solomon’s theory failed to 
recognize is the inextricable connection this background feeling plays in providing a source of 
meaning from which judgments are sourced, and even by accommodating larger and larger 
objects of emotion, it remained unclear how a judgment incorporates this feeling. In this section I 
discuss another cognitive theory of emotion by Peter Goldie. Although Goldie goes beyond 
bodily feelings and recognizes the need to accommodate a separate and externally-directed 
component of feeling beyond the body, I argue that a phenomenological understanding of the 
background feeling of belonging to a world does not fall neatly into an internal and external 
distinction of feeling. 
In The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration, Peter Goldie’s means of incorporating 
feeling into emotional experience places his theory in contrast with other cognitive theories of 
emotion, like Solomon’s. Goldie describes many of the philosophical approaches to emotion as 
the “add-on theory” of emotions: they capture the intentionality of emotion, but the feeling 





 Feelings are the most intimate part of emotional experience, yet when philosophers 
discuss the intentionality of emotion, feelings often become compartmentalized into 
physiological categories and separated from the emotion’s intentional component in a way that 
detracts from the emotional experience. Goldie states that it is rationalizing the emotions in this 
way—reducing emotions to cognitive states, emotional contagion, and evaluative judgments—
that often over-intellectualizes the emotions by excluding feeling.
2
 Feelings are not only essential 
for directing, motivating, and shaping an initial emotional response, they make emotional 
judgments easier and quicker. Goldie provides an example of a piece of rotten, maggot-infested 
meat. The fact the piece of meat is rotten is justification for not eating it, but the immediate 
feelings of repulsiveness and disgust that motivate that judgment are also justified by the same 
fact, and it is the speed by which feelings reveal these particular salient features of the meat that 
we might not reach with the same speed by a judgment alone.
3
 Instead of limiting feeling to a 
physiological role, what sets Goldie’s cognitive theory apart from Solomon’s is he posits two 
types of emotional feelings that appear to be at work within this example. The first is the internal 
feeling of disgust and repulsiveness directed toward the body. The second type of feeling is the 
external feeling of disgust and repulsiveness directed outwards towards the emotion’s object, the 
piece of meat.  
Feelings play a central and epistemic role in revealing the nature of our world through 
emotional experience. Some feelings, such as a bodily feeling of fear, disclose an introspective 
and qualitative understanding of the nature of perceived bodily changes within particular 
emotions we are experiencing at that time. In that a bodily feeling can detect changes in the 
condition of the body during an emotional experience, they are intentional in that they are 
                                                          
1. Goldie, “Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality,” 242. 
2. Goldie, The Emotions, 50. 
3. Goldie, “Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge,” 98. 
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directed towards the body. While a bodily feeling manifests a sensation of perceived bodily 
changes, what they reveal may not be strictly limited to the body. They may also bring awareness 
to the presence of something outside of the body. The bodily feeling of fear may manifest itself 
as a rise in the hairs on the back of the neck or an increase in heart rate, but such a sensation also 
discloses that there is something fearful within the vicinity. As they are directed towards the 
body, a bodily feeling will never be able to identify what that fearful object outside the body is, 
but such a feeling does provide a tentative justification to believe there exists something fearful 
nearby. While bodily feelings disclose an introspective understanding of our emotions directed 
toward the body, other feelings disclose an “extraspective” understanding of the world directed 
toward objects outside of the body.
4
 
In order to expand upon the “add-on theory” of emotions, Goldie posits that when an 
emotion is directed towards an object outside of the body, one is experiencing a “feeling 
towards” an object. What has been overlooked in other cognitive theories of emotion is the 
notion of content, the perceived determinate properties of an object that provide justification for 
the subject’s way of thinking.5 Using his example of the piece of rotten meat, the emotion 
involved a judgment that found the meat meriting disgust, and while this captures the intentional 
aspect of emotional experience, Goldie suggests the “extraspective directedness toward the world 
outside one’s body, will at the same time capture an important aspect of its phenomenology.”6, 7 
One does not simply judge the piece of meat as meriting disgust but simultaneously perceives the 
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object’s determinate properties, such as the putrid smell or maggot infestation, that allow one to 
perceive the object’s content as disgusting. Judging the meat to be disgusting represents the 
intentional aspect of this emotional experience, but arriving at the judgment with disgust, 
perceiving the object’s content as disgusting, captures a phenomenological component of feeling 
Goldie calls “feeling towards.” The phenomenological and intentional components of emotional 
experience, Goldie says, are inextricably intertwined. 
 What lies at the forefront of Goldie’s cognitive theory of emotion is the primacy he 
provides for feelings in emotional experience. Previously we saw what Solomon meant by 
feelings was limited to bodily feeling as physiological responses, and apart from perhaps 
providing a conscious arousal to the fact one is experiencing an emotion, Solomon’s bodily 
feelings did little in telling us what emotions were about. Goldie’s theory provides emotional 
experience with both bodily feelings and feelings towards in a way that captures the bodily and 
world-directed intentionality of emotion as well as a phenomenological component of feeling. 
Goldie is correct in recognizing the need that a theory of emotion must accommodate an 
externally-directed component of feeling beyond the body, but like Solomon’s theory, I believe it 
again becomes unclear how his two components of feeling, bodily feelings and feelings towards, 
combine to account for a background feeling of belonging to a world.  
It remains unclear how these components of feeling accommodate the background feeling 
of belonging to a world, first, because it often remains unclear what constitutes the distinction 
between these two types of feeling in the first place. Goldie states explicitly that a feeling 
towards does not involve bodily feelings as they lack the required “direct” intentionality with the 
emotion’s object outside the body, so a provisional distinction here has already been established. 
However, Goldie allows bodily feelings a sense of what he calls “borrowed intentionality,” a 
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bodily feeling ultimately coming to be about the object of the emotion: “all the feelings are 
‘united in consciousness’ in being directed towards its object: united ‘body and soul’, ‘heart and 
mind’.”8 The bodily feeling of the hairs rising on the back of the neck alerting the body to the 
presence of something fearful nearby “borrows” from the judgment that an object outside the 
body has been perceived as fearful. While for Goldie bodily feelings and the world-directed 
feelings towards represent two distinct categories of feelings, from an experiential perspective 
the two are often experienced as indistinguishable. For this reason, if from an experiential 
perspective both bodily feelings and feeling towards are often united in emotional experience in 
a way that is indistinguishable, it appears that what is needed is a phenomenology of feeling that 
does not make a distinction between these two types of feelings.  
Second, Goldie’s two components of feeling are both directed towards objects through 
intentional states, and whether or not the experience of these two components may be 
experientially indistinguishable, it remains unclear what motivates a feeling towards without 
reference to a background structure. When one experiences a feeling towards an object, fear for 
example, one perceives certain determinate properties about that object that explain why one 
experiences the associated feelings of fear. But what orientates a feeling towards that allows one 
to react to an object’s determinate properties in a personal and relevant way? Goldie states that a 
feeling towards is an “unreflective emotional engagement with the world,” and as such, they are 
unlike other psychological phenomenon that can be reduced to attitudes, beliefs, or desires.
9, 10
 
Unlike a belief, it would not be irrational for a feeling towards to oscillate between feeling one 
way toward a particular object and not feeling that way, as feelings often fluctuate during 
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 Furthermore, one may believe there is nothing to fear when perceiving 
a particular object, such as seeing a needle in a medical clinic, yet remain disposed to feel a rush 
of fear whenever the object is present.  This is due to a degree of what Goldie calls “cognitive 
impenetrability,” the extent to which one’s emotional experience is unaffected by one’s relevant 
beliefs. Recall from chapter one that Solomon’s evaluative judgments acquired a degree of 
personal responsibility in that an evaluative judgment is susceptible to rational intervention. But 
being cognitively impenetrable, such rational reflection or intervention does not appear to be the 
case with a feeling towards. For this reason it remains unclear what motivates a feeling towards 
without reference to a background structure that remains an ever-present context from which 
such feelings may be motivated. 
Although Goldie goes beyond bodily feelings and recognizes the need to accommodate a 
separate and externally-directed component of feeling beyond the body, I argue that it remains 
unclear, first, whether or not we are able to make a clear distinction between internal and 
external components of feeling, and second, it remains unclear what motivates a feeling towards 
without reference to an underlying structure in which one is already inhabited prior to an 
emotional experience. Just as Solomon’s generalized mood was unable to account for a 
background feeling of belonging to a world out of which a mood arises, a phenomenological 
understanding of this same feeling does not fall neatly into Goldie’s internal and external 
distinction of feeling. In the next section I consider how an internal and external distinction of 
feeling reflects a tendency in philosophy to obscure a fundamental understanding of the 
background structure and the world in which we already find ourselves prior to an emotional 
experience. I draw on the work of Edmund Husserl’s conception of the “natural attitude” to 
demonstrate how everyday experience presupposes a background feeling of belonging to a world 
                                                          
11. Goldie, The Emotions, 73. 
23 
 






























Chapter III: Husserl, the Natural Attitude, and the Background of Experience 
 
The current task is to explicate further the underlying structure through which one 
already finds oneself belonging to a world prior to an emotional experience. I argue that 
perceptual and cognitive theories of emotion maintain a tendency in philosophy to assume as 
irreducible this underlying structure, and I use Edmund Husserl’s criticism of naturalistic 
methodology to identify the perspective through which many of these theories formulate an 
understanding of the world through propositional attitudes. All cognitive activity presupposes a 
sense of what it means for an object to be in a world. The world is not an object articulated 
through intentional states, and a pre-intentional background sense of belonging to a world lies as 
a precondition for taking objects through intentional states. 
In the first section I gave a brief example of Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B. M. de 
Waal’s Perception-Action Model (PAM) theory to highlight some of the recent developments 
within the perceptual and cognitive theories of emotion. In Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate 
Bases, Preston and de Waal state the PAM theory, together with prefrontal cortex functioning, 
provides an empirical account of how the perception of another’s affective state generates a 
process of automatic responses within the prefrontal cortex that then primes the corresponding 
subclass of perception-act mechanisms to create a representation of the other’s affective state in 
the observer.
1
 Preston and de Waal’s PAM theory provides a basis for understanding the 
development of subject-object perception of experiential changes in terms of their evolutionary 
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advantages in reproductive success and social behavior, such as mother-infant responsiveness 
and interpersonal emotion.
2
 Furthermore, in that it provides a basis for subject-object perception 
of experiential change, the PAM theory may plausibly be extended to account for the 
evolutionary advantages of group interdependence in perceiving our world through experienced 
states of similarity, familiarity, and practicality.
3
 
 The PAM theory provides an example of how perception-based theories of emotion help 
conceptualize the experiential structures through which the world becomes intelligible in 
everyday experience, and it is upon these experiential structures that we find cognitive theories 
of emotion, like Solomon’s and Goldie’s, assuming as irreducible the intentionality of subject-
object relationships and propositional framework through which their theories depend. I have 
attempted to make clear what is needed is a phenomenology of feeling that recognizes a 
background world is already in place before anything is given within a propositional framework. 
The PAM theory may be able to explicate the process through which, for example, one may 
perceive in an object the determinate properties that provide the content of fear, and a cognitive 
theory of emotion may be able to explicate how this fearful content manifests itself in the mind 
as an evaluative judgment of fear. But to say that an object is or is not something to be feared is 
already presupposing a sense of what it means for this object to “be” in a world. This act of 
judgment requires something underlying, a pre-intentional background that presupposes what it 
means for an object to be in a world and structures the possible ways in which it may be 
experienced. 
Naturalistic and scientific accounts of the world often maintain a tendency to presuppose 
a world that is already disclosed prior to scientific inquiry. Within the term “naturalism,” in this 
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context, I refer specifically to the concern regarding the relationship between an empirical 
account of the world and our experience of that world. By already being in a world, naturalism 
often presupposes the intelligibility of the world that it takes as its object of inquiry. For 
example, science does not begin from nothing but rather is already immersed in a world. The 
scientific method, as a human achievement, already has its grounding in a human world. It is in 
this light that scientific questioning begins with an “epistemically privileged” and detached 
perspective in understanding the world.
4
 The perspective becomes “detached” by the fact that a 
scientific method investigating the world or human experience reduces each to the observation of 
a “thing,” and to consider Anita Williams, “we cannot ask questions about the meaningfulness of 
human experience, as our experience loses its defining qualities when conceived of as a 
measurable entity.”5 Scientific methodology allows for the investigation of our world through 
this detached perspective, and in doing so it must presuppose a background sense of belonging to 
a world, a world already inhabited by objects. Thus, through a scientific methodology there is a 
pre-intentional background sense of a world that becomes neglected. Edmund Husserl was 
critical of the grounding of scientific methodology and the metaphysical limitations placed on an 
understanding of our world through this perspective. From a phenomenological perspective, this 
pre-intentional background becomes taken for granted in what Husserl called the “natural 
attitude.”  
The natural attitude is neither a good thing nor a bad thing but simply the ordinary way 
we see things in everyday experience. In that each person inhabits a unique perceptional 
standpoint, no two people will ever dwell in the same natural attitude. Dwelling in the natural 
attitude, we are unaware that we are participating in it and the role it plays in shaping the world 
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around us. Objects in everyday experience are not encountered first as corporeal, unfamiliar 
entities upon which we then imbue with practicality and significance through propositional 
subject-object relationships. Because we are dwelling in the natural attitude, objects in everyday 
experience are already encountered within a context of practicality and significance: “This world 
is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world 
of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world. I simply find the physical things in 
front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value 
characteristics…”6 However, dwelling in the natural attitude masks a profound naivety. We take 
for granted a perceptual certainty of our familiar world. There is a naïve acceptance of the world 
and the unity of things appearing as factually existing actualities. The observation of an object 
within the natural attitude is to recognize only what is factually present before me. We take for 
granted, for example, that maintaining the proposition “x observes p” must presuppose a sense of 
what it means for p to be the case in a world, a sense that is inclusive of other possibilities of 
being. What becomes taken for granted by everyday experience is a pre-intentional background 
sense of reality and perceptual certainty that frames our experience of objects within the world. 
This pre-intentional background sense of reality and certainty is not something that may 
be understood in terms of intentional states because it is this pre-intentional background sense of 
reality that structures specific experiences and beliefs. We may say, as Somogy Varga puts it, 
that experience has two interconnected poles, “a pre-intentional relation to the world that makes 
up the tacit background of any experience, and the intentional relation we have when we 
experience an object.”7 The world that makes up the tacit background of any experience 
conditions our taking of objects through intentional states. Using the previous example, the 
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proposition “x observes p,” to believe p to be a real object under my observation requires a sense 
that is founded upon what it means for something like p to “be” in a world: “the pre-intentional 
sense of realness and certainty is a precondition for adopting any propositional attitude; it carries 
the sense of what it is for something to be the case.”8 A scientific methodology, already 
immersed in a world, taking its starting point from within the natural attitude would inevitably 
misconstrue the intentional nature of consciousness in a reduction to factuality.
9
 By the reduction 
of things to factually existing actualities, a scientific perspective realizes a “detached” 
perspective in its observation of our world as an object.  
Husserl’s critique of a scientific methodology highlights the need for a phenomenological 
approach that puts aside our naïve acceptance of reality in order to understand a domain of 
consciousness left unreflective by the natural attitude. Scientific methodology, rather than 
investigating how objects are constituted before us, begins by presupposing the reality and 
certainty of objects through the natural attitude. But to place emphasis on a scientific 
understanding of the world, Husserl claims, obscures the fact that before a judgment is made of 
an object, there is an implicit understanding of what it means for this object to be in a world that 
is not exhausted by its observation within the natural attitude. Husserl explains that “objects are 
always pre-given to us, pre-given in simple certainty, before we engage in any act of cognition. 
At its beginning, every cognitive activity presupposes these objects. They are there for us in 
simple certainty; this means that we presume them to exist and in such a way as to be accepted 
by us before all cognition, and this is in a variety of ways.”10 The world in which we already find 
ourselves is neither something that can be understood through nor articulated by the 
propositional subject-object relationships of the natural attitude: “the world as the existent world 
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is the universal passive pre-givenness of all judicative activity, of all engagement of theoretical 
interest.”11  
From this perspective we may see a similar critique at work in a cognitivist theory of 
emotion, such as Solomon’s. For example, it did not appear that Solomon’s positing of a two-
world distinction to accommodate our experience of a personal world, reality and surreality, was 
able to explicate how evaluative judgments arise within a context of meaning without accounting 
for a background sense of belonging to a world already inhabited when an evaluative judgment is 
made. Within the experiential structures of many cognitive theories of emotion, like Solomon’s 
and Goldie’s, the intentionality of subject-object distinctions and propositional framework are 
often assumed as irreducible, a perspective similar to the one we adopt through the natural 
attitude. This position highlights the need for a phenomenological approach that recognizes a 
background world that can never be objectified through the structures of intentionality.   
I have stated many of our emotional experiences presuppose a background feeling of 
belonging to a world that shapes the possible ways through which objects in the world may be 
experienced during an emotion. The world in this sense is not an object articulated through 
propositional subject-object relationships but rather lies pre-given before a judgment is made and 
presupposed through the natural attitude. Neither is the background feeling of belonging to a 
world able to be expressed through bodily feelings, feeling towards, the Perception-Action 
Model, nor any combination of intentional states. These background feelings of belonging to a 
world are not directed at particular objects but shape the possible ways objects show up within a 
space of practical and meaningful significance. A theory that perhaps best summarizes this type 
of feeling is Matthew Ratcliffe’s account of “existential feelings.” In the next section I develop a 
phenomenological approach using existential feelings in order to overcome some of the 
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Chapter IV: Ratcliffe, Our Sense of Reality, and Existential Feelings 
 
When we have an emotional experience, we have already found ourselves in a world. In 
this section I define a “world” in this context and use Matthew Ratcliffe’s theory of “existential 
feelings” to demonstrate what shapes and motivates a background structure within the context of 
a world. Existential feelings operate as a pre-intentional background sense of belonging to a 
world that shapes much of our experience of the world. I provide four examples of existential 
feelings. In the first two I compare and contrast existential feelings of hope and hopelessness. In 
both examples I demonstrate how existential feelings operate as a category of feeling that 
permeates all cognitive activity and contributes to a sense of relatedness with the world. In the 
last two I use alterations in everyday activities and perturbations of reality through mental illness 
to provide examples of how existential feelings, operating indiscernibly in the background of 
experience, may be forced to the foreground of experience. I conclude by returning to Solomon 
and Goldie to highlight some of the challenges faced by a cognitivist view and how developing a 
phenomenological approach using existential feelings may allay some of these concerns.  
 I have stated that much of our emotional experience presupposes a sense of belonging to 
a world, but what exactly is a “world” in this context? Like Husserl, Matthew Ratcliffe similarly 
attempts a phenomenological understanding of a world that many naturalistic and scientific 
accounts neglect and presuppose by taking the world as an object of study. Consider the 
experience of perceiving a cat.
1
 Even upon recognition of the cat as being present or not present, 
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all such judgments presuppose a sense of what it is to “be” in a world. For example, we may 
experience the cat as being “there,” present alongside us in a world, but this experience of the cat 
as being “there” is phenomenologically distinct from other possible forms of experience, such as 
imagining or doubting the cat. These distinctions are intrinsic to the nature of experience—we 
experience possibilities—and without the ability to grasp distinctions in possible forms of 
experience we would be unable to take any entity as being or not being real. Sensing the cat as 
being real, being “there,” carries with it a pre-intentional background sense of what it means for 
something like a cat to “be” that cannot be reduced to intentional states. The ability to find 
intelligible these distinctions in possibility is what Ratcliffe calls our “sense of reality.” The 
world in this context is a space of possibilities that constitutes our sense of reality, a pre-
intentional background that is taken for granted by the experience of an entity as being “there.” 
The world we find ourselves belonging to is a modal space that incorporates various 
kinds of possibilities and potentialities that frame the various ways we encounter objects. These 
possibilities are an integral part of the way in which we experience the world. Ratcliffe explains 
that experience incorporates various kinds of possibility, such as habitual certainty.
2
 For 
example, I take for granted the solidity of the floor remains constant while walking upon it. 
Other possibilities form anticipations of what an entity is, such as the uncertainty of a shadowed 
figure in the dark. However, Ratcliffe says the phenomenology of possibility does not restrict us 
to the potential perceptions of scenarios that we could actualize or things we could do. 
Experience also incorporates ways in which possibilities appear significant to us. Possibilities 
may appear significant to us in various ways, such as enticing or threatening. Possibilities do not 
only present themselves in the form “I could do p;” instead, they lure us in such a way that their 
perception reflects our various practical concerns so that “how something is significant to us, 
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how it ‘matters’ to us, is at the same time a sense of the possibilities it has to offer.”3 The 
experience of observing a beautiful sunset, for example, may inspire a feeling of awe in a way 
that reveals the sunset not only in terms of possibilities, such as the possibility of viewing the 
sunset, but also in terms of personal significance that is reflected by my finding the sunset to be 
beautiful and awe-inspiring. 
Ratcliffe coins the term “existential feelings” to describe our sense of the various kinds of 
possibilities that make up our sense of reality. Existential feelings constitute this background 
sense of belonging to a world, a world that exists as a modal space of possibilities that appear to 
us in personal and meaningful ways. They shape the possible ways in which objects may be 
meaningfully experienced, ways that reflect our personal and practical concerns. They are 
inextricable from our sense of reality in that they “determine what kinds of intentional states are 
among one’s possibilities.”4 
Existential feelings constitute a background sense of belonging and relating to a world 
through which all cognitive activity is structured. To illustrate this point further, compare the 
following four examples of existential feelings. In the first two I compare and contrast existential 
feelings of hope and hopelessness. Existential feelings in both examples demonstrate a category 
of feeling that permeates all thought and activity and contribute to a sense of relatedness with the 
world. For the most part, existential feelings operate indiscernibly as a backdrop to our everyday 
lives. In the last two examples I use alterations in everyday activities and perturbations of reality 
through mental illness to provide examples of how existential feelings may be forced to the 
foreground of experience. 
In the first example, consider Ariel Meirav’s example of the effect of hope on a 
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terminally ill patient. Even if the odds of a cure were low, the patient may find herself 
experiencing an “intense hope that expresses itself in high spirits, active cooperation with the 
doctors, and enthusiastic engagement in long-term creative or scholarly projects, in spite of the 
difficulties. Her emotional and motivational attitudes seem to reflect some kind of positive view 
of the future.”5 Hope, in this example, manifests as a profound change in the patient’s 
relationship with the world, a change that casts a positive light on all her interactions with others 
and shapes the various possibilities for future-oriented activities in a positive way. Hope as an 
existential feeling plays a distinctive phenomenological role compared to other emotions.
6
 Hope 
has contributed to the way the patient finds herself in the world and shaped her experience of the 
illness and her thoughts toward treatment. In this case, hope is not an intentional state concerned 
with specific instances of hope but a background feeling that allows the patient to experience her 
circumstances in a positive and meaningful way that is hopeful.  
Second, consider the effect of hopelessness in a patient diagnosed with major depressive 
disorder. Hopelessness in clinical depression is not episodic in that it manifests during brief 
episodes or towards particular objects. According to the DSM-5, major depressive disorder 
presents feelings of sadness, emptiness, or hopelessness most of the day, nearly every day, with 
an accompanied loss of pleasure in nearly all activities.
7
 Although one may be hopeless 
regarding a specific situation, hopelessness in this sense is not a feeling about something specific 
nor is it a generalized mood that covers specific or large numbers of objects. It represents a shift 
in the structure of experience. Discussing hopelessness and despair, Anthony Steinbock presents 
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this shift as a loss of grounding for sustainable hope: “I do not just give up doing this or that…I 
give up altogether. I may wish that things were different, but I cannot hope. It is not just that this 
one particular thing is not sustainable; it is not just that all things are lived as impossible; rather, 
there is no sustainability.”8 Like with hope, hopelessness as an existential feeling is pre-
intentional and characterized by the distinctive role it plays in shaping a patient’s sense of what 
is possible. In hopelessness the world is no longer a space of meaningful and enticing 
possibilities. Hopelessness as an existential feeling shapes the world in a way that diminishes the 
patient’s sense of belonging and prevents a future-oriented grounding for sustainable hope. 
In the next two examples, consider how a disturbance in an activity or perturbations of 
reality through mental illness disrupt the role existential feelings play as part of the background 
structure and unity of experience. For the most part, however, this background structure remains 
obscured behind everyday experience within the natural attitude, and if it were not for 
disturbances and perturbations in our everyday experience, we might remain oblivious to it. In 
the third example, if we use an example of a disturbance to remove the context of practicality 
and intelligibility from the experience of an object, then encountering this object would be a 
significantly different experience. Most of the objects we encounter in everyday experience are 
not really “encountered” at all but rather seamlessly absorbed into our activities. Consider 
Ratcliffe’s example of using a computer keyboard: “I do not first perceive the keys as discrete 
entities, then assign a functional role to them and finally act upon them. Rather, I encounter the 
keyboard as something useable, as something that has immediate practical significance in the 
context of my project.”9 Not only does everyday experience integrate the keyboard into the unity 
of experience but I too am integrated into the experience. There is no clear distinction between 
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the keyboard and me. However, consider a case where the keyboard suddenly fails to function. 
My body that had once lied inconspicuously within the unity of experience is all of sudden 
brought to the foreground. My body, now as a conspicuous entity, disrupts the absorption of the 
world through the body. It is in moments of disturbances that Ratcliff says the “conspicuous 
body is, at the same time, a change in the sense of belonging to the world, often a retreat from a 
significant project in which one was previously immersed, a loss of practical possibilities that the 
world previously offered.”10 The disturbance reveals, if only briefly, a background sense of 
belonging to a world that we take for granted by the unity of experience. 
In the fourth example, take the perturbations in one’s experience of reality through 
mental illness, such as clinical depression. Through everyday experience we encounter objects 
within a context of significance, presupposing a space of certain possibilities through which 
existential feelings allow objects to matter to us in significant ways. Consider Aaron Beck’s 
description of depression: “The thought content of depressed patients centers on a significant 
loss. The patient perceives that he has lost something he considers essential to his happiness or 
tranquility; he anticipates negative outcomes from any important undertaking…”11 Through 
depression the patient’s sense of belonging to a world is transformed, not only removing from 
the world various kinds of possibilities the patient might otherwise purposively pursue but also 
the ability to find happiness in anything. Possibilities that may once have appeared as enticing no 
longer appear as such. Patients gradually lose the sense that anything might offer happiness. 
Severe depression often produces changes in a patient’s experience of time in that this 
transformation of possibilities results in the anticipation of “negative outcomes from any 
important undertaking” in a way that removes the grounding for hope, and recovery appears 
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impossible. The loss of orientation toward future possibilities makes the experience of 
depression feel eternal. Perturbations in existential feelings result in a transformation in how one 
finds oneself in a world, and central to this transformation is an alteration in the perceived sense 
of possibilities.  
Using existential feelings as the basis for a phenomenological approach to understanding 
emotions allow us to focus on one aspect of emotion that has been largely neglected by a 
cognitivist view of emotion. In the first and second chapters I introduced two cognitivist theories 
of emotion, Solomon and Goldie, both of which left unclear how emotions as intentional states 
arise within a personal and meaningful context. What appears to be neglected is that, when we 
have an emotional experience, we have already found ourselves with a background sense of 
belonging to a world. This background sense of belonging to a world that existential feelings 
provide makes possible that specific occurrences of emotion are able to arise in a personal and 
meaningful context. In that they constitute a background sense of belonging, they are unlike 
emotions represented through a cognitivist perspective. In the following, I return to Solomon and 
Goldie and adopt a phenomenological approach to explore two ways existential feelings address 
the challenges facing each cognitivist view respectively. 
In the first chapter I stated Solomon’s theory held, first, that emotions were always about 
something, meaning emotions always take objects through intentional states. Second, it was 
emotions as evaluative judgments that structured our reality to make objects what they are 
through emotional experience: I did not first encounter a snake and then determine it to be 
frightening; rather, an emotion structured my reality in a way that I immediately experience a 
frightening snake. Following an evaluative judgment was the affective component of emotional 
experience, a physiological response that played no significant role in emotional experience for 
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Solomon. The ways objects appear to us through our emotions in our personal world, surreality, 
reflect what we hold to be personally meaningful and significant. Thus, emotions as evaluative 
judgments, not feelings, provide the source of meaning in our personal lives. However, by 
limiting feelings to bodily feelings, I argued the primary challenge facing Solomon’s theory was 
that it remained unclear how evaluative judgments contain within them the sole source of 
meaning of our experienced world.  
In doing away with feeling as a significant component of emotion, Solomon’s challenge 
was regarding how evaluative judgments arise within a context of meaning and value out of an 
objective world bereft of such meaning. Addressing this challenge begins with the division of 
experience through Solomon’s two-world distinction, reality and surreality. It appears Solomon’s 
two-world distinction is a result of addressing a dualistic concern within a cognitivist view of 
emotion, where emotional experience is divided into two components with an affective 
component on one side and an intentional component on the other. The first component is 
subjective while the second is objective, involving objects in the world. A peculiarity of this 
division becomes evident when we consider an example where the object of an emotion appears 
either not to exist or is not true.
12
 Recall from the aircraft example that the aircraft as a fearful 
object need not constitute a “fact” in the real world but only my belief that the aircraft posed a 
threat, nor did the object need to be true as I was only able to maintain the aircraft as a fearful 
object until either landing or realizing the aircraft posed no danger, therefore terminating the 
emotion. Thus a paradox arises regarding how an object of emotion may be “in the world” 
without existing or being true. Solomon’s answer to this paradox is his two-world distinction: 
“There are rather two standpoints, one detached and one personally involved. All objects of our 
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emotions are in surreality: Reality is irrelevant except on reflection.”13 If it is an emotion that 
shapes an object to be what it is, then objects of our emotions need not be factually existing 
entities in reality but rather constituted by an emotion through our surreality. 
However, from a phenomenological perspective there remains a position within 
Solomon’s account that remains to be challenged. I have stated that within a cognitivist view of 
emotions we find a tendency to assume as irreducible the intentional structures through which 
these theories operate. It is in this light that, rather than addressing a dualistic concern, 
Solomon’s positing of surreality appears as a continuation of the divisional separation a dualistic 
perspective places on our understanding of emotional experience within a world. Surreality 
posits an additional “attitude” through which the world is experienced through intentional states. 
In this case, we are still dwelling within the natural attitude when we experience an emotion 
through our surreality. Solomon’s emotions are always about something, and as such, surreality 
continues a description of our world from a detached perspective by limiting our understanding 
of the nature of emotional experience to the taking of objects through intentional states. 
Surreality appears to solve one issue by absolving the need for objects of emotion to be factually 
existing entities, but it remains unclear whether or not this is sufficient to overcome the 
remaining challenges faced by the natural attitude. What Solomon’s two-world distinction 
appears to take for granted is a pre-intentional background sense of belonging to a world that 
operates as a background context through which emotions source their meaning and personal 
significance. 
It is from this phenomenological perspective that existential feelings proffer a resolution 
to the challenge faced by Solomon. Existential feelings are unlike the emotions in Solomon’s 
account. Emotions generally take the form of intentional states while existential feelings 
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represent a category of feeling that amounts to a felt sense of belonging to a world.
14
 Existential 
feelings are not about something: “whereas emotions are usually directed towards specific 
objects, events or situations, existential feelings are not about anything specific.”15 One is 
already in a world when one experiences an emotion, and for this reason emotions may develop 
intentional states involving bodily or world-directed feelings. As part of the background structure 
of intentionality, existential feelings are pre-intentional in that they constitute a sense of the 
kinds of possibility the world offers through propositional subject-object relationships. Using the 
previous example of hope, we are able to distinguish between hope as an intentional state and 
hope as an existential feeling that permeates all of one’s thoughts and experiences. The 
experience of hope presupposes distinctive kinds of possibilities. In order to experience hope as 
an intentional state, one must already find oneself in a world where hope is not only a possibility 
but a possibility where oneself has to matter in a certain sort of way.
16, 17
 In attempting to have 
emotions constitute the framework through which our world is experienced, Solomon’s surreality 
obscures this important distinction between instances of emotion and a pre-intentional 
background in a way that existential feelings do not. In doing away with feeling, Solomon’s 
surreality appears unable to accommodate the unique way in which we belong to a world that 
presupposes distinctive kinds of possibilities, such as hope. 
 In the second chapter, Goldie’s primary contribution to the cognitivist perspective was 
recognition of the phenomenological component of emotion, the capturing of a first-personal 
qualitative “what-it-is-likeness” of emotional experience.18 This contribution went beyond a 
traditional cognitivist view of emotion that highlights the intentional component of emotional 
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experience while compartmentalizing the affective component through physiological categories 
of bodily feelings. While bodily feelings may provide an introspective understanding of the body 
during an emotional experience, Goldie recognized an extraspective category of feeling directed 
towards the world outside the body through what he called feeling towards. In the second chapter 
I argued the challenge facing Goldie is two-fold. In recognition of these two categories of 
feeling, the first challenge facing Goldie’s theory is one he appears implicitly to acknowledge. 
During an emotional experience, these two categories of feeling, bodily feeling and feelings 
towards, are often indistinguishable. Thus it becomes unclear whether or not a phenomenology 
of feeling is able to make a clear distinction between these two types of feeling. Second, as a 
feeling towards remained an unreflective psychological phenomenon, an additional challenge 
remained as to what motivates a feeling towards without reference to a background sense of 
belonging to a world.   
 In recognizing the phenomenological component of emotional experience, Goldie faced a 
challenge in distinguishing between a bodily feeling that contributes to the emotional experience 
through “borrowing” from the emotion’s world-directed intentionality and a feeling towards. 
There are times during an emotional experience where “our entire mind and body is engaged in 
the emotional experience…”19 It became unclear whether or not a phenomenology of feeling is 
able to distinguish between these two types of feelings during an emotional experience. 
However, addressing this challenge may not be whether or not from a phenomenological 
approach we are able to make a clear distinction between these two types of feeling but instead 
whether or not we may be able to identify cases where these two categories are, at least in some 
cases, two perspectives of the same thing.  
 An inextricable element of Ratcliffe’s sense of reality is a “felt” sense of belonging to 
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world. Often much of the literature we use to describe existential feelings, such as a sense of 
unfamiliarity or uneasiness, incorporates a sense of something both “felt” and at the same time a 
way of relating to a world. There are emotions that involve feelings directed towards the body 
and there are emotions that involve feelings directed towards objects outside the body. Ratcliffe, 
however, is critical of the distinction between bodily and world-directed components of feeling, 
since as it appears at least in some cases such as a sense of unfamiliarity, there is not a clear 
distinction between these two types of feeling during an emotional experience. For cases like this 
Ratcliffe suggests that Goldie’s two components of feeling, bodily feelings and feelings towards, 
may represent a sort of “double counting” of feelings; bodily feelings are just feelings towards. 
Ratcliffe gives the example of holding a snowball.
20
 The snowball feels cold. In this example the 
hand begins as the vehicle of perception through which the snowball is perceived. But within a 
few seconds the feeling of the cold snowball begins to grow too cold, the hand starts to ache with 
pain, and the experience becomes unpleasant. It is no longer the snowball that is perceived but 
the hand, a feeling now directed toward the body. There has never been a change in the location 
of the feeling; it has always remained in the hand. There has only been a change in what it is a 
feeling of. The hand can be the vehicle through which an object in the world is felt or the hand 
can become the object that is felt. “To touch,” Ratcliffe says, “is to experience a relation between 
one’s body and an object it comes into contact with…One’s body can be a conspicuous object of 
awareness or an invisible context of tactile activity.”21 In touching the snowball, rather than 
drawing a distinction between bodily feelings and world directed feelings, a bodily feeling 
became a means of experiencing something outside the body, a matter of relatedness between the 
body and the world. Feelings of the body and feelings of an object are two perspectives of the 
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same thing: “existential feelings are feelings in the body, which are experienced as one’s 
relationship with the world as a whole.”22 The body may not always be an explicit part of 
experience, but it nevertheless remains a framework through which the world is structured. For 
this reason, existential feelings are also bodily feelings which are experienced as one’s 
relationship with the world, recognition of which poses a serious challenge to Goldie’s internal 
and external division of feeling. This also explains why an alteration in existential feelings, such 
as a sense of uneasiness, may manifest as both a shift is perceived possibilities and a “felt” sense 
of uneasiness in the body.  
 The second part of the two-fold challenge to Goldie’s position stated that if a feeling 
towards remained an unreflective psychological phenomenon, then what motivates a feeling 
towards without reference to a background sense of belonging to a world? In chapter two I stated 
that a feeling towards, being an “unreflective emotional engagement with the world,” maintained 
a degree of what Goldie called cognitive impenetrability. In this case feeling towards were 
largely unaffected by one’s relevant beliefs. For example, we saw in chapter one that an 
evaluative judgment acquired a degree of personal responsibility in that an evaluative judgment 
is susceptible to rational intervention. But being cognitively impenetrable, such intervention does 
not appear to be the case with a feeling towards. Goldie provides a brief discussion of what may 
be the psychological structure lying behind a feeling towards, the “recognition-response tie,” 
which posits a primitive relationship between recognition and response that configures an 
emotionally motivated response to a perceived object.
23
 For example, the perception and 
recognition of an object’s determinate properties as dangerous merit a particular sort of response, 
particularly fear. Still, this leaves further questions regarding what orientates a recognition-
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response tie to allow one to react to a perceived object’s determinate properties in ways not just 
relevant to a specific scenario but ways that are personal and meaningful. Thus it became unclear 
what motivates a feeling towards without positing a background structure that remains an ever-
present context from which such feelings may be motivated in personal and meaningful ways.  
 It may be that existential feelings proffer a perspective from which this challenge may be 
addressed. Goldie’s recognition of the phenomenological component in emotional experience 
puts him a step closer than Solomon in acknowledging feeling as inextricable from the world-
directed aspect of emotion. While Goldie maintains that bodily feelings cannot have world-
directed intentionality, they may contribute through a sense of borrowed intentionality in such a 
way that both bodily feelings and feelings towards, at least in some cases, become experientially 
indistinguishable in emotional experience. Indistinguishable as they may be, bodily feelings only 
“borrowing” from other world-directed intentional states, having no “direct” intentionality of 
their own, allow Goldie to maintain a division between body and world, specifically with the 
categorization of feeling through an internal and external distinction, bodily feelings and feelings 
towards. Questioning this premise, I used the snowball example to demonstrate how the body 
may directly and actively participate as a means of experiencing something outside the body. 
The example provided a challenge to Goldie’s division between body and world by 
demonstrating some cases of bodily feelings and feelings toward an object to be two perspectives 
of the same thing. What appears to be the limiting Goldie’s recognition of a background structure 
is his strict categorization of feeling through an internal and external distinction. From a 
phenomenological approach, there are cases where no clear distinction is able to be made 
between these two types of feelings. Thus, in setting aside an internal and external categorization 
of feeling, it becomes plausible to posit existential feelings as a category of feeling that accounts 
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for a background structure that is both a bodily feeling and a way of relating to the world. 
When we have an emotional experience, we have already found ourselves in a world. The 
world in this context exists as a modal space of possibilities, and the ability to distinguish 
between various possibilities through experience is what Ratcliffe calls our sense of reality. 
Possibilities present themselves not only as opportunities to be actualized but also in terms of 
significance. Existential feelings are what allow the world to develop within a context of 
personal significance. Hope and hopelessness as existential feelings demonstrate how existential 
feelings operate as a background sense of belonging to a world that permeates all cognitive 
activity and contributes to a sense of relatedness with the world. Existential feelings operate 
inconspicuously as a backdrop to our everyday lives, but alterations and perturbations in 
existential feelings contribute to perceived changes in the unity of experience, alter our sense of 
agency, and affect how all of reality appears. Adopting a phenomenological approach to 
understanding the background structures of emotion captures a category of feeling that appears 
to be missing in a cognitivist theory of emotion. Existential feelings operating as part of the 
background structure of experience provide a more fecund source of meaning and significance in 
our lives than Solomon’s framework of evaluative judgments as well as a means of de-
















The aim of this thesis was to call attention to some of the shortcomings of a cognitivist 
theory’s incorporation of feeling into a philosophy of emotion. I stated there has been a tendency 
within certain cognitivist theories to assume as irreducible the intentional structures through 
which these theories operate. In chapters one and two I used the cognitivist theories of Robert C. 
Solomon and Peter Goldie to demonstrate how a consequence of this tendency often sees 
feelings compartmentalized through internal and external distinctions, such as bodily feelings 
and world-directed feelings. The goal was to bring into focus the notion that prior to all 
emotional experience we have already found ourselves belonging to a world, and attempts at a 
phenomenological understanding of a category of feeling as a pre-intentional background sense 
of belonging to a world prior to experience become obscured or dismissed. I argued this category 
of feeling appears to be ignored from within the cognitivist perspective.  
In chapter three I used Husserl’s conception of the natural attitude to suggest developing 
a phenomenological approach in illuminating the background structure of emotion presupposed 
by a cognitivist view, ultimately arriving at Matthew Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings as 
a means of proposing this approach in chapter four. Through a series of four examples I 
demonstrated existential feelings operate as a pre-intentional background sense of belonging and 
relating to a world that shape the possible ways objects may appear to us in personal and 
meaningful ways. I concluded by returning to Solomon and Goldie to proffer a 
phenomenological approach using existential feelings to allay some of the challenges facing a 
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cognitivist view of emotion. I argued existential feelings illuminated the pre-intentional 
background obscured through Solomon’s two-world distinction of emotional experience as well 
as a means of de-compartmentalizing the internal and external distinctions of feelings found in 
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